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In “Dialectic of/or agitation?: Rethinking argumentative virtues in Proletarian
Elocution,” Satoru Aonuma breaks new ground in a field largely neglected by
argumentation theorists and Marxists alike: the argumentative virtues of
revolutionary political speech. I emphasize “revolutionary” in order to raise certain
questions concerning the author’s conclusion that Marxist speech be evaluated
under the generic rubric of “civic virtues.” I will contend that “civic virtues” are
virtues that contribute to the health a given polity. The aim of revolutionary speech,
in contrast, is to incite the overthrow of the established order. Good revolutionary
speech would thus have the opposite effect of civically virtuous speech.
Aonuma’s paper is an analysis of a neglected text in the history of Marxist
and argumentation theory, Eido Kondo’s Proletarian Elocution (1930). I have not
read the book—indeed, since it has not been translated into English I could not read
the book—but Aonuma’s paper does a effective job explicating its core arguments.
Still, since I have not read the book, I have nothing of interest to say about Aonuma’s
commentary. My own comments here are thus not so much a critical evaluation of
Aonuma’s reading of Kondo’s text as it is an attempt to think along with Aonuma
about the general philosophical problem it raises. That general philosophical
problem is the degree to which revolutionary speech can be evaluated as a civic
virtue. As I have already noted, I do not think this conclusion is sound. Before
explaining why not, I need to set my comments in the context of the relationship
between argument, rhetoric, and truth.
Aonuma cites Terry Eagleton’s contention that when it comes to political
speech, Marxists are obliged to be Platonists. Eagleton’s point—with which Aonuma
rightly disagrees—is that Marxist agitators cut through the rhetoric of bourgeois
ideology to lay bear the unvarnished truth of capitalism. Marxism is thus committed
to uncovering the objective reality masked by bourgeois ideology and setting that
reality out for people without adornment, without manipulating emotional
flourishes, without rhetoric, in the sense of speech that pleases an audience. The
Marxist, like the Platonist, is committed to explaining the truth and nothing but the
truth.
But this goal is impossible. Kondo’s text is written with the tradition of
classical rhetoric in mind. Political speech must not only be true, it must move
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people. This point is of especial importance for the revolutionary, who aims to
inspire in people the courage to challenge and overthrow the ruling class. Hence the
Marxist orator must be equally concerned with logic and rhetoric, to making a true
case, but to make it in a way that mobilises the masses for the fight a revolution will
involve. Revolutionary political argument that proves incapable of motivating
political action is not true revolutionary argument. If the argument that revolution is
necessary fails to inspire people to revolution, it would seem to be not only
ineffective, but untrue.
So far I believe that Aonuma is correct and that one cannot separate cognitive
and affective elements in political speech. Political oratory that did nothing but lay
out some sort of statistical or theoretical reasons for opposing capitalism would fail
utterly to move people in the direction it needs to move people if its proper goal is
to be realized. But revolution is not only the goal of Marxist political speech, it is also
its truth. When one turns to the question of the truth of Marxist political speech a
potential problem of Aonuma’s argument opens up.
Aonuma suggests that we consider Marxist speech as a subset of political
speech and evaluate it according to the classical tradition of the civic virtues. But
those were virtues instilled to defend the polity, whereas Marxist political virtues
are virtues instilled in people who want to overturn the established order. Indeed,
the truth of Marxism as a political theory depends on the extent to which it enables a
successful political practice. In other words, Marxism is true if and only if it is
possible for the proletariat and its allies to overthrow capitalism and build a free,
democratic, socialist society. The role of rhetoric would be to help forge proletarian
class consciousness; good revolutionary speech is speech that unites the
revolutionary forces against the established order, including whatever civic virtues it
recognizes.
Aonuma aimed to make no more than a beginning in a new field of research
in his paper, and to that extent I think it is an unqualified success. As that project
develops, three important questions to consider might be: are there virtues unique
to revolutionary political speech? If so, what are they, and what is there relationship
to truth, in the ‘Platonic’ sense in which Eagleton invokes it?
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